Al Abid / Tammuz missiles

[hayder]

Iraq's first multi-stage IRBMs.

[التوبوليف العراقية]

فلم اطلاق صاروخ العابد وهناك معلومة عن سقوطه في منطقة في جنوب شرق اسيا في البحر فهل هذا صحيح ؟

[hayder]

The first test was to test the multi-stage separation, which failed. No further tests happened because iraq was pursuing the more advanced "Condor 2000" (Badr) in association with Argentina / Egypt

[hayder]

Saddam’s space program

by Dwayne Day
Monday, October 26, 2009
Comments (25)

The invasion and occupation of Iraq is one of the great foreign policy mistakes the United States has made in the recent past. But whereas historians will be asking questions about the war for decades to come, it also offers the opportunity to answer some questions as well. Among the big questions are: What happened to Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and why? Why was the CIA so bad at intelligence about the weapons?

But there are also some questions with less immediate impact, but that still retain historical significance. What happened to naval aviator Scott Speicher in the opening hours of the first Gulf War? (A question now apparently answered.) Why did most of the Iraqi air force fly to Iran during that war? Did the pilots do it of their own volition? And did they think it was better to give their old enemy their airplanes rather than lose them to their new enemy’s air strikes? Why did an Iraqi airplane attack the USS Stark in 1987? What exactly did supergun genius Gerald Bull do for Iraq during the 1980s? And what was the Iraqi space program?

In the late 1980s Iraq had a space program. Iraq even got so far as to develop a 50-kilogram test satellite. On December 5, 1989, Iraq launched a 25-meter long rocket from a launch pad 230 kilometers southwest of Baghdad. Iraq described this as a “satellite launch system,” and there were initial erroneous reports that the rocket had placed several objects in orbit. In reality, this was only a test of the first stage and the vehicle’s second and third stages were only steel mockups. The CIA determined that this was not a prototype ballistic missile—it was large and ungainly, and had to be launched from a fixed position making it vulnerable to attack. In a top secret 1990 report, Iraqi Ballistic Missile Developments, the CIA stated that Iraq was indeed trying to build a satellite launching vehicle, but faced many technical challenges, such as staging and guidance.

In the late 1980s Iraq had a space program. Iraq even got so far as to develop a 50-kilogram test satellite.
After the United States invaded and occupied Iraq, it was possible for US intelligence agencies, as well as the United Nations, to roam Iraq collecting evidence about its various weapons programs. The United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, known as UNMOVIC, gathered substantial information on various Iraqi ballistic missile programs, including information on the Al Abid space launch vehicle. Much of the information was gathered from documents turned over by the Iraqis in 1995 after a high-level defector prompted the Iraqis to preemptively release documents they had been hiding in a chicken farm in order to blunt the defector’s damage. UNMOVIC also gathered additional information after the American invasion in the form of interviews and other documents. That information is now contained in a massive report on various Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs.

Starting a space program
Iraq began its space efforts around 1988. The program operated under several names, including the declared name of Al Abid as well as alternate names such as Bird (“Al Ta’ir” in Arabic) and Comet. Iraq began development of its indigenous space program after an effort to cooperate with another, unnamed, country failed. However, according to UNMOVIC, at least one other country provided assistance, and one or two additional countries were also sought for help but did not provide it. The identities of all these countries have not been revealed by UNMOVIC, probably in an effort to pursue a counter proliferation strategy.

The project was carried out under the overall direction of the Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization. In mid-1988 the Space Research Corporation (SRC) began studying development of a launch vehicle capable of placing a 100–300 kilogram payload into a 200–500 kilometer orbit. The vehicle had to be developed using existing systems. A second team, apparently consisting of two foreign experts from an unnamed country, also assisted. According to Iraqi officials involved in the program and interviewed later, the project was always civilian—although that was a rather loose definition.

SRC evaluated several different options, including configurations of four to six extended burn-time SCUD rockets clustered around a single extended burn-time SCUD as a second stage and a new third stage. By early 1989, the SRC had settled on a design consisting of five SCUDs clustered for the first stage, another for the second stage, and a “double-base propellant” rocket for the third stage. The foreign specialists proposed a different design: a single SCUD as a core stage surrounded by strap-on rockets consisting of four or eight SA-2 liquid propellant rockets from a surface-to-air missile, or four or eight SCUD rockets. The second stage would be either liquid or solid propellant, and the rocket would also include an apogee kick motor. Space Research Corporation experts rejected this design approach.

The SRC leadership produced a development schedule for the Al Abid with the goal of making the first launch by December 12, 1990. Initially, the design had an enlarged payload shroud to house the satellite, giving it a hammerhead appearance. But General Ra’ad, who oversaw Iraq’s missile development programs, proposed increasing the diameter of the third stage to 1.25 meters in order to avoid this hammerhead shape. He also designed a clamshell payload fairing.

By mid-1989, the Al Abid design consisted of a five-SCUD first stage, a 1.25 meter diameter liquid propellant rocket for the second stage, and a third stage that might have been a modified SCUD with a larger diameter tank. The SCUD is .88 meters in diameter, so the second stage was actually wider than the individual SCUDs used in the first stage.

Testing and foreign assistance
In December 1989 the Iraqis conducted their first test launch of the Al Abid from a fixed launch site at Al Anbar. Although this was only a test of the first stage, it took place a mere six months after the SRC had developed their project timeline—a fast pace that UNMOVIC attributed to foreign assistance as well as the “practical approach in modifying and developing different versions of the SCUD” that project manager General Ra’ad was known for. The second and third stages were steel mockups. A videotape retrieved from the Haider chicken farm in 1995 showed that the first stage worked successfully for 45 seconds until the vehicle exploded. The Iraqis suspected that explosive bolts between the first and dummy second stages may have fired prematurely, causing the accident, but this was still a partial success at getting a complex vehicle off the ground.

The Iraqis also approached two foreign countries to purchase a more powerful engine, but they were rebuffed. The countries offered to launch Iraq’s satellites themselves, but would not sell them engines.
The Iraqis quickly determined that the performance of the second stage was crucial to the overall performance of their rocket. They had increased the diameter of the second stage to boost its power, but ran into additional problems. The SCUD liquid propellant engine lacked the necessary thrust. They initially sought to increase the performance by increasing the expansion ratio of the engine nozzle and changing the fuel. The SCUD nozzle was designed to operate from sea level up, so it was relatively narrow. The second stage would ignite at higher altitude, and if it had a wider expansion it would improve the thrust performance. They changed the expansion ratio from 10 to 30 by adding a skirt. They also changed the TM 185 fuel to diethylenetriamine (DETA) or a mixture of DETA and unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine (UDMH). An initial engine test was partially successful until the expansion skirt burned through—a result of being tested at sea level rather than in at simulated high altitude.

The Iraqis also approached two foreign countries to purchase a more powerful engine, but they were rebuffed. The countries offered to launch Iraq’s satellites themselves, but would not sell them engines. The Iraqis also apparently began developing a new first-stage engine with four SCUD combustion chambers and a single turbo-pump. However, development work halted with the onset of the 1991 Gulf War.

After the December 1989 test launch, the Iraqis decided that the second and third stages of the Al Abid should be tested separately. They planned a test for autumn 1990 that they referred to as Al Kharief, or “Autumn.”

The Al Kharief became the focus of international controversy. United Nations inspectors claimed that this was a new missile, whereas the Iraqis claimed that it was the upper stages of the Al Abid. In reality, it was both part of the Al Abid and a test platform for a nuclear delivery system under development by the Iraqis.

Around mid-1990, Al Kharief work was proceeding very slowly, prompting a meeting of all relevant parties. However, it became clear to project leaders that the development was plagued by disagreements and differing priorities. The Al Kharief test ground to a halt, and the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait led to the suspension of all activities. According to General Ra’ad, no final report was ever produced and no drawings of the vehicle were available.

The S-13 nuclear delivery system
Saddam Hussein had long sought a nuclear weapon, but Iraq’s program had been sporadic and ineffectual at producing one. In 1987 Iraq started a new program to develop a nuclear bomb, and Iraqi missile experts began discussions with the Iraq Atomic Energy Commission about the development of a ballistic missile to deliver it. The nuclear weapon would have a weight in excess of two metric tons with a diameter of 1.25 meters. The missile required a range of 650 kilometers. These requirements were beyond the capabilities of Iraq’s missiles and so the nuclear weapon designers were told that they would have to reduce the size of their planned weapon.

In April 1989 Iraq started work on Project S-13, the development of a long-range nuclear-tipped missile. A senior Iraqi military leader later stated in an interview that although the weapons designers declared in 1988 that they wanted a missile ready by 1991, he believed it would take until at least 1993 to produce one.

Initially, Project S-13 evaluated three options: a 1.25 meter diameter missile capable of delivering a one-ton weapon 1,200 kilometers; a derivative of the Al Hussein/Al Abbas missile that could reach 650 kilometers; and an unmodified SCUD-B missile with a range of only 300 kilometers.

Clearly Iraq wanted to develop a space program. But why?
Iraqi statements and documents on the S-13 project are inconsistent. Some documents indicate that the Iraqis viewed the new project as a replacement for the existing Al Abbas conventional missile. According to one senior general, his plan was for the Al Abid space launch vehicle’s second and third stages to form the basis of the nuclear missile. But General Ra’ad, who was in charge of the Al Abid development, insisted that he was unaware of plans to use his rocket for nuclear delivery and that nobody ever approached him about using the Al Kharief (the “Autumn” test of the Al Abid second and third stages) for such a purpose. It is possible that General Ra’ad was in fact unaware of or disagreed with the plans, but the disparity remains, and UNMOVIC investigators concluded that there was a tie between the programs, “although the precise details of the relationships are unclear.” UNMOVIC added, “What is clear, however, is that these activities were contributing to the long-term solution for a delivery vehicle for the nuclear weapon under the overall control or oversight of General Amer Al Sa’adi.”

Unanswered questions
Although the United Nations report mentions a 50-kilogram test satellite, it contains no further details, not even a photograph. Also missing are details about the purpose of the program. Clearly Iraq wanted to develop a space program. But why? Was it motivated primarily by prestige, a desire to become the first Arab nation to launch a satellite? Or was Saddam Hussein seeking to develop a satellite reconnaissance capability to monitor his neighbors? Unfortunately, those are not questions of great interest to United Nations arms inspectors, or even US intelligence agencies. But it is possible that a more peaceful, stable, and open Iraq will enable these questions to be someday answered.

[hayder]

Al Tamouz
The Al Tamouz missile project had as its aim the development of a missile with a range
of 2000 km and a payload of 200 kg. The design comprised a two-stage missile
consisting of one SCUD as a first stage and one SA-2 sustainer rocket as a second stage.
Iraq declared that the programme started in May 1989 and was terminated two months
later in July 1989.

Iraq claimed that only paper studies had been made, although
General Ra’ad stated during a meeting in April 1996

that a “mock-up” of the Al Tamouz had been built to show to General Hussein Kamel and General Amer Al Sa’adi and was later dismantled. Among the reasons cited for the abandonment of the
programme were problems with the stage separation and inability to place a guidance system on the second stage, Additionally, General Sa’adi was not keen on the concept . believing that it would not fly.

Al Abid Space Launch Vehicle
As declared by Iraq, Al Abid was a project to design and manufacture a space launcher
capable of putting a satellite into orbit and was an entirely civilian project. The project
commenced in 1988 around the end of the Iran/Iraq war. The programme’s declared
name was Al Abid, but alternate names such as Bird (Al Ta’ir in Arabic) or Comet were
also used, particularly early on. The project was carried out under the auspices of MIMI
and involved scientists from Iraq’s Space Research Centre, who had built a 50 kg test
satellite and engineers from Project 144, primarily Project 144/2, to develop a launch
vehicle, as well as other support groups. According to General Amer Al Sa’adi, though,
there was no steering committee for the programme.

Iraq had initially considered a joint venture with a foreign country to have their satellite
launched but when this did not work out a decision was made to develop its own
launcher. To assist Iraq’s engineers, in mid-1988, Space Research Corporation (SRC),
and another team of two specialists were engaged separately for technical support. Their
task was to prepare independent studies for a space launcher capable of delivering a 100-
300 kg payload to a low earth orbit (about 200-500 km altitude). The delivery system had
to be produced using assets already existing in Iraq, mainly SCUD 8K14, versions of indigenously modified SCUD and SA-2 liquid propellant missiles. The SRC had also
been working on the development of the Supergun (see Chapter IV.VII).
A number of design configurations were studied by SRC. Among the initial design
options studied were configurations based on 4, 5 or 6 extended burn-time SCUD rockets
as a first stage clustered around another extended burn-time SCUD as second stage, with
a specially designed solid propellant rocket as the third stage.

Another study focused on various configurations using 5 or 7 SCUD-based rockets as a first stage, separated from a second stage modified SCUD rocket by an inter-stage mechanism, and a specially
designed rocket for the third stage. By early 1989, the SRC proposals had apparently
converged on a design comprising 5 clustered modified SCUDs for the first stage;
another modified SCUD for the second stage and a double-base propellant rocket for
third stage.

The other team of two foreign specialists provided the results of their studies in two
reports in February 1989. Their studies were based on design configurations
comprising a modified SCUD rocket with strap-on rockets of either four or eight SA-2
liquid propellant rockets or four or eight SCUD rockets. Both a liquid propellant and a
solid propellant second stage were considered and a representative apogee motor was
used for their parametric calculations. Iraq’s engineers did not pursue launcher designs
based on these configurations, apparently preferring SRC’s proposals.
Following their initial studies, SRC made a proposal to achieve an earliest possible first
launch test by setting up a team of approximately 35 professional staff to work with the
other Iraqi team.

According to a senior Iraqi, though, there was no formal contract with
SRC for the launcher’s development, unlike the case with the Supergun. However, SRC
personnel continued to be closely associated with the Al Abid project. It was stated that
technical support was requested and paid for as needed. A proposed schedule was presented by SRC for the development of the Al Abid, as shown in Figure IV.III.XIX, which would achieve a first launch by 12 December 1990.

Whilst receiving external support, Iraqi specialists from Project 144 were working on
their own designs. Several sets of drawings were provided to UN inspectors from the
Haidar farm, all of them produced by Project 144/2 between 1989 and 1990, which
depicted various versions being considered for the Al Abid. Two of them are presented in
Figures IV.III.XX and XXI. The modified arrangement of the jet vanes for the cluster of
five SCUD engines is shown in Figure IV.III.XXII.

With regard to the payload housing, at the beginning the diameter of the third stage was
insufficient to fit the satellite. SRC suggested using an enlarged shroud, as shown in their
design drawing in Figure IV.III.XXIII. General Ra’ad proposed a solution with the
second and third stage having the same diameter that is, 1250mm, as shown in the Iraqi
drawing, Figure IV.III.XX. For this configuration, General Ra’ad designed a clamshell
type shroud that was separable from the third stage by explosive bolts.

The basic vehicle design configuration chosen by the Iraqis by mid-1989 consisted of
five clustered, extended burn SCUD engines for the first stage and a 1250mm diameter
liquid propellant rocket for the second stage. It is unclear if details of the third stage
rocket had been determined at that time, although some evidence points to use of another
modified SCUD.

The major effort at the time was on the first and second stages.
The first test launch of the Al Abid occurred in December 1989 at the fixed launch site
that had been constructed at Al Anbar. The test took place only six months after the SRC
delivered their timeline proposal and 12 months before their proposed test launch date.
However, only the first stage of the vehicle tested was operational, while stages two and
three were steel mockups. A videotape of the test retrieved from the Haidar Farm showed
that the first stage of five clustered SCUD missiles was working successfully until the
vehicle exploded at 45 seconds. Iraq suspected that the explosive bolts that were being
used to effect stage separation functioned prematurely. Photographs of the test vehicle
being prepared for the test launch are shown in Figures IV.III.XXIV and XXV.

The fast development of Al Abid first stage could be explained by the extensive foreign
support received. But also, General Amer Al Sa’adi had put General Ra’ad, the manager
of Project 144/2, in charge of the airframe group developing Al Abid. General Ra’ad was
well known for his practical approach in modifying and developing different versions of
the SCUD and his expertise was a key factor in successfully clustering five SCUDS.

While primary concentration in the initial flight test was on validating the first stage,
work for the second and third stages had also commenced. In the initial design studies
undertaken by SRC, the second stage was to be a SCUD with an extended burn-time but
with the standard airframe diameter of 880mm. However, by the beginning of 1989 the
diameter of the second stage had been increased to 1250mm.

General Ra’ad who was in charge of the airframe design in Project 144/2 stated in 1996 that this change had come about through discussions with the Al Abid work team headed by General Amer Al
Sa’adi. General Sa’adi himself said in another interview that it had always been his
intention that the second stage of the Al Abid space launch vehicle would be the basis of
the delivery vehicle for a nuclear device (discussed below) and that this vehicle would
have an internal diameter of 1250mm.

The main problem that Iraq had with the second stage was that a standard SCUD liquid
propellant engine produced only sufficient impulse to achieve their minimum
requirements. SRC had highlighted through its early parametric studies that orbital
capability, that is, heavier payload or higher orbit, was markedly more sensitive to
changes in second stage performance than to changes in the first stage performance.

They proposed that the performance of the second stage rocket engine could be
improved, firstly, by increasing the expansion ratio of the engine nozzle from 10 to 30 by
addition of a nozzle skirt and, secondly, by changing the TM 185 fuel to
diethylenetriamine (DETA) or a mixture of DETA and unsymmetrical dimethyl
hydrazine (UDMH).

As an alternative to improving the performance of the SCUD liquid propellant engine,
Iraq had tried to import a more powerful engine. General Amer Al Sa’adi stated that he
visited two foreign countries trying to purchase such an engine but he failed. Both
countries offered their services to launch the satellite for Iraq but denied access to a more
powerful engine.

Consequently, Iraq focused on improving the SCUD engine. Project
1728, headed by General Modher, was conducting work in parallel with the work done by
Project 144/2, looking to improve the performance of Al Abid second stage engine. A
test was carried out on 1 Dec 1990 by Project 1728 that used a nozzle extension for
increased expansion ratio and UDMH as fuel for higher energy. However, without any
cooling to emulate a high altitude condition the skirt melted (Figure IV.III.XXVI) and the
test failed after 14 seconds.

In addition to investigating the use of UDMH, according to General Modher’s
statements, project 1728 was looking to further develop the capabilities of its engine
design group and the Al Abid project provided a good opportunity for doing this. Iraq
declared that they came up with the idea to use a new engine with four SCUD
combustion chambers and a single turbo-pump for the Al Abid first stage. The new
engine would fit the 1250mm airframe, and using a mixture of DETA and UDMH instead
of TM 185 fuel would provide an alternative to the cluster of five SCUD missiles.
General Modher contracted a former teacher of his from a foreign country to design the
turbo-pump, designated as the HF turbo pump, capable of feeding the assembly of four
SCUD combustion chambers. General Amer Al-Sa’adi gave the approval for this project
just after the Al Abid test in December 1989. To fulfil a request from General Hussein
Kamel, the same person had been contracted just prior to starting on the HF turbo pump
to design a 30 tonne thrust liquid propellant engine, known as the HK engine. Ultimately,
the primary designs of the HK engine and the HF turbo pump were made but they were
not completed due to the onset of the 1991 Gulf War.
Another foreign company was

also contacted in mid-1990 to design and manufacture a similar turbo pump but again due
to onset of the 1991Gulf War and its outcome this proposal went no further.
Following the partially successful test launch in December 1989, it was decided,
according to General Ra’ad, that the combined second and third stages needed to be flight
tested separately.

A test was scheduled for the autumn of 1990. This planned test was
referred to as Al Kharief (meaning “Autumn”). Al Kharief (alt. sp. Al Harith)
The planned flight test of the combined second and third stages of the Al Abid as a
separate ground launch vehicle which was declared by Iraq as Al Kharief, together with
information obtained during several interviews of key Iraqi personnel, led some UN
inspectors to believe that Al Kharief was, in fact, a separate missile project. Iraq insisted
in its Missile CAFCD that this was not the case.

Nonetheless, if the flight test had occurred, it would have served two purposes. At face value, it would have progressed the development of the Al Abid space launch vehicle but also, as discussed below; it would
have contributed to the development of a delivery vehicle for the secret nuclear weapon.
In the work that continued after the December 1989, Al Abid flight test with its dummy
second and third stages, effort concentrated mostly on development of the second stage of
the Al Abid (first stage of the Al Kharief test vehicle). General Modher and his team
(Project 1728) continued work, independently of General Ra’ad and 144/2, on
improvement in performance of the liquid propellant engine and, additionally, on some
airframe items, for example, thrust mounts for the 1.25 metre diameter airframe. General
Ra’ad continued with his design work, basing his designs on the standard SCUD engine
performance. Work on the 1.25 metre diameter airframe was well underway. Due to
difficulties in manufacturing, General Ra’ad had placed orders with a foreign engineering
company for 20 sets of 1.25 m Z rings for the second stage (10 sets ordered on 9 January
1990 and delivered, and 10 sets ordered on 28 March 1990 that were not delivered)

In .addition, end domes for the tanks were procured from abroad. According to General
Ra’ad, two fuel tanks and one oxidiser tank were manufactured equipped with Z rings
and longitudinal stiffeners, on the same principle as in the SCUD. A possible design
configuration for the Al Kharief test vehicle, found in the Haider farm documents, is
shown in Figure IV.III.XXVII.

Around mid-1990, because the pace of the Al Kharief work was not proceeding quickly
enough, and because General Hussein Kamel was pushing for completion of the work for
an autumn launch, General Amer Al Sa’adi asked General Ra’ad to convene a meeting
where all relevant parties would be represented and specific tasks assigned to each of
them. The meeting took place on 17 June 1990. However, because different groups were
in conflict with each other and there were other priorities, only Project 144 personnel
actually turned up. Little further work occurred on the planned Al Kharief test (or other
aspects of the Al Abid project) after this meeting owing to the invasion of Kuwait in
August 1990 and subsequent events. General Ra’ad stated several times in interviews in
1996 that, to his knowledge, no results, no documents and no drawings were available in
relation to Al Kharief and his work group wrote no final report.
53
S 13 - The nuclear weapon delivery system.
In early 1987, Iraq started a programme to develop a nuclear explosive “device”. This
project had been initiated within the IAEC (Iraq Atomic Energy Commission) and
undertaken by PC3 (Petrochemical Group 3 – a name given to disguise its real purpose).
According to General Amer Al Sa’adi, the first informal contacts to discuss the
integration of the nuclear device with a delivery system had taken place in 1987 between
himself and the IAEC.

Then on 7 May 1988, the first formal meeting was held between
PC3 and the Director (General Hussein Kamel) and Deputy Director (General Amer Al
Sa’adi) of MIC. At this meeting the IAEC gave the main data regarding the device. The
weight was in excess of 2 tonnes and its diameter was 1.25 m; the range required was 650 km.

As these parameters were beyond the capabilities of any of Iraq’s existing
missiles the meeting concluded that PC3 would endeavour to reduce the size and weight
of the nuclear device as far as possible and MIC would develop a missile that could
accommodate the eventual device. At that meeting, the chairman of the IAEC stated that
a period of three years had been set for the programme.

Since the nuclear weapon project was a secret programme very few Iraqi specialists were
informed about it. Only members of Group Four established within PC3 were aware of
all the details of the work.

With the objective in mind of developing a delivery system,
work was undertaken within other MIC missile activities that would lead to a suitable
nuclear weapon delivery system. According to information provided in interviews,
General Amer Al Sa’adi personally managed progress on this objective by ensuring that
the direction and activities of missile work under his control catered for this secret
project. During an interview in 1996, General Sa’adi was asked for information about the
management of the nuclear delivery system and he responded that no document ever
contained any reference to that purpose and that everything was only in his mind.

However, on 2 April 1989, an administrative order was issued by MIC for work on
Project S-13. Based on information gathered during interviews and documentary
evidence produced by Iraq, S-13 was the project most directly concerned with the longterm development of the delivery system for the nuclear device.
General Sa’adi declared to UN inspectors that, following the May 1988 meeting; it was
his view that it would take several years to develop a delivery system for the nuclear
weapon, at least until 1993. He stated that even though the IAEC had indicated a threeyear timeline at that meeting for completion of the nuclear device, that is, by 1991, he did
not believe that the device would have been ready before 1993.
From the information gathered in numerous interviews with General Amer Al Sa’adi,
General Ra’ad, the manager of Group Four in PC-3 and some other high ranking
scientists involved, three options were pursued by Iraq for a nuclear delivery system:
63
1. a missile with diameter 1.25 m capable of delivering a warhead of at least one
tonne to a range of almost 1200 km ;
2. a derivative of the Al Hussein/Al Abbas missile designed to deliver a warhead of
one tonne up to 650 km and to accommodate a nuclear package of 0.8 m
diameter;
3. an essentially unmodified SCUD-B missile, accepting a range limitation of 300
km.

Activities under these three options are described in the following paragraphs.
Option 1 – the long-term option
Following the administrative order issued in April 1989, work commenced on Project S-
13. The exact purpose of this project was never explicitly declared. However, several
reports were provided to UN inspectors. In one report, a design is given for a 1.25 m
diameter missile with a payload of one tonne, as shown in Figure IV.III.XXVIII.
Figure IV.III.XXVIII Design of S-13 presented in the report issued on 7 August 1990

In the report, comparative reference is frequently made to Al Abbas characteristics,
suggesting that S-13 may have been seen, at least by some, as an Al Abbas upgrade. The
missile diameter and payload given in the S-13 reports, though, are consistent with the
requirements for the nuclear weapon. The study results demonstrated maximum ranges
between 850 and 1180 km.
In numerous interviews with UN inspectors, General Amer Al Sa’adi stated consistently
that it had always been his intention that the second stage of the Al Abid space launch
vehicle would be the basis for the nuclear delivery vehicle.


Comment
In this context it is understandable why the diameter of the second stage of the Al Abid
was changed from 0.8 m to 1.25 m around the beginning of 1989, as noted above in the
description of Al Abid project. Furthermore, much of the activity undertaken under the Al
Abid programme to improve the performance of the second stage can be readily seen as
applicable to a nuclear weapon delivery system with a payload of one tonne.
As described in the Al Abid section above, Project 1728 was pursuing its own
independent activities to improve the second stage performance through the use of more
energetic fuels and alternative liquid propellant engine designs. General Ra’ad and his
airframe team, Project 144/2, however, in the development of the Al Abid vehicle design
undertook the mainstream activity. These activities included the responsibility given by
General Sa’adi to General Raad after the June 1989 meeting to take overall responsibility
for coordinating preparations for the Al Kharief test.

In interviews relating to his work on the second stage for Al Abid, however, General
Ra’ad repeatedly stated that he was unaware of General Sa’adi’s thoughts about using the
second stage for a nuclear weapon delivery vehicle. He also stated that no one ever
approached him about using the Al Kharief concept as a surface-to-surface weapon.

When asked about S-13, General Ra’ad stated that this was a designator for Al Abbas.
He further stated that he never worked with a 1.25 m diameter under the S-13 name but
that, to his knowledge, it was a study to improve the stability of the Al Abbas missile. It
was also declared by Iraq that the successful development of the Al Abid second stage
could have also provided a long-term solution to improve the Al Abbas capabilities. It
is unclear if the S-13 project was portrayed as an improvement programme for Al Abbas,
but development activities under the S-13 designation were, at least for General Sa’adi,
essentially for achieving a long-term solution for a nuclear weapon delivery system.

Comment.
All the information provided to UN inspectors indicated that there were links between the
development activities undertaken for the Al Abid second stage, the S-13 project and an
improved Al Abbas, although the precise details of the relationships are unclear. What is
clear, however, is that these activities were contributing to the long-term solution for a
delivery vehicle for the nuclear weapon under the overall control or oversight of General
Amer Al Sa’adi.
Option 2 – the “crash programme” option
Early in 1990 the Director of MIC, General Hussein Kamel, feeling that the PC3 project
was taking too long, instituted a “crash programme” to rapidly complete the project.

To hasten the development of the nuclear device, instead of following the normal path of
uranium enrichment, he ordered the reprocessing of Iraq’s safeguarded nuclear fuel. He
also knew General Sa’adi’s view that it would take several years to develop a delivery
vehicle, but regarded this opinion as too conservative. Accordingly, in August 1990,
General Hussein Kamel went directly to General Raad and told him to develop a system
in a hurry. He was given a six months timeline. General Ra’ad assumed a device diameter
of 880mm and a total payload weight of one tonne and with these requirements
developed a preliminary design based on the original Al Abbas missile. With a maximum
engine burn time of 103 seconds, he estimated a maximum range of 630 km. Because of
the imminent outbreak of war the project did not proceed. In later interviews with UN
inspectors, General Ra’ad defended his solution and its probability of success but General
Sa’adi characterized it as unrealistic.
Option 3 – the fallback option
The only proven option that Iraq could have used as a “fall-back” option, as
acknowledged by General Amer Al Sa’adi, would have been to use an existing 8K14
(SCUD-B) missile, since it had the capability of delivering a payload of one tonne, and to
accept the range of 300 km.

Comment
This may explain why there were ten remaining SCUD missiles that Iraq did not modify
to Al Hussein missiles.

Project 144/2 infrastructure
During the last quarter of 1986, a team was established that conducted feasibility studies
on the reverse engineering of the SCUD (8K14) missile for the purpose of the indigenous
manufacture of this type of missile in Iraq. In parallel, the Project 144 team was working
to modify the SCUD missile in order to achieve a longer range. The two groups were put
together to decide what the problem was with the failure of the modified SCUD that was
flight tested in February 1987. One group said it was instability and the other said it was
a guidance and control problem. Management knew they would have severe difficulty
fixing the guidance problem and decided to go with the instability problem. The problem
concerned the position of the center of gravity with the weight change and elongation of
the missile. With this is mind, Project 144/2 worked on developing a design for the new
missile. However, Project 144/2 had an inherent deficiency in the area of design
capability, a prerequisite for effective reverse engineering efforts.
To overcome this shortfall, Project 144/2 established a small design section (less than six
people) in September 1987 at the Central Tool Room Plant in the Nasser State
Establishment. The Nasser establishment was selected because of its proximity to the
Project 144/2 facility at Taji. The Project 144/2 design section relied upon the assistance
of Nasser for the measurement of parts and the production of drawings. However, the
Project 144/2 design team ran the entire effort, without Nasser knowing exactly what they were working on. They were strictly a supporting agency, providing Project 144/2 with
administrative and logistical assistance as required (in addition to the design team at the
CTRP, Project 144/2 maintained an administrative office at Nasser as well).
Reverse engineering had been a mission statement from the start of Project 144/2. From
September to December 1987, this reverse engineering mission could be pursued in
parallel with the ongoing modification development effort. As missile airframes were cut
up for use in the conversion of other SCUD missiles to Al Hussein missiles, the materials
were being analyzed and drawings made.
Together with the Project 144/2 leadership, the workshops attempted to identify the
technologies required to produce the parts and components in question. While much
information was gained through the examination of cannibalized parts, the tempo of
modification dictated that the available time for access to these dismantled parts would be
limited. In late August 1987, Unit 224 turned over to Project 144 a combat missile that
had been filled in 1985 with fuel and oxidizer and was not fired and hence technically
considered a non-combat missile. This missile was quickly disassembled, and its parts
divided among the relevant workshops and research and development groups. The Engine
Group received its initial combat engine for reverse engineering purposes at this time, but
it was not from this missile; instead, the engine left over from the 21 April 1987
cannibalization was turned over, with Project 144 retaining this engine for future use.
Sketches concerning the extended airframe were made early on, and did not represent a
major obstacle to the goals of Project 144/2. Of more concern were the reinforcement
rings of the airframe and warhead. For these items, special attention had to be paid to the
shape, radius and metal type (metal samples were sent to various establishments in Iraq
for analysis). However, the requirements brought on by the impending "War of the
Cities" forced the Director of Project 144/2 to cease all reverse engineering efforts by
December 1987 in order to fully concentrate on the demands of mass modification. Only
the small design team at Nasser continued to work on reverse engineering efforts,
continuing as it did to conduct measurements and produce drawings using Nasser CTRP
assets. Also, work on the warhead continued and a crude example of it was manufactured
and tested on 24 February 1988.
At that time, Iraq had no one experienced in the cutting and welding of stainless steel
used in the SCUD missile. They received assistance from the Daura refinery and began
with a pipe-cutting machine for the circular cutting of the airframe. They eventually
lengthened the missile by the use of a hand held argon welder. For alignment, they used
theodolite devices and fine wire string. Initially it took fifteen to twenty days to
accomplish the extension of the airframe.

When UN inspections commenced in 1991, Building 16 at Taji was identified as one of
eight Project 144/2 buildings. This building was not damaged during the war. It contained
several standard, general-purpose drilling and riveting machines.

Building 18 was also part of Project 144/2. It was the assembly facility for the Al
Hussein missile, with indigenously produced, rather than modified SCUD, propellant
tanks. UN inspectors at this building observed fourteen SCUD fuel tanks, all damaged or
destroyed, and several pieces of damaged surveying equipment used to align components
during assembly.
Building 21 was also part of Project 144/2. This building was the welding shop of
Project 144/2, where Al Hussein propellant tanks were produced from end domes, which
were made at the Al Nasser State Establishment and from cylinders produced in Project
144. They also produced sea mines, made by welding together domes identical in size to
those used to produce SCUD/Al Hussein tanks, but made of ordinary steel rather than
stainless steel. Over 100 corroded, but undamaged sea mine domes and several damaged
missile propellant tank sections were found.
Building 22 was also part of Project 144/2. In this building the Iraqis produced the
propellant tank inserts that were used to make Al Hussein missiles from SCUDs. One
hand held welder and a cutting and drilling machine were found, but they were all
completely damaged beyond repair. The building was also completely destroyed.
Building 24 was also part of Project 144/2. It was basically the SCUD receiving facility
where the missile would be disassembled and the pieces would be sent out to the other
Project 144 areas. Once the other Project 144 areas completed their work, the pieces
would come back to building 24 for reassembly. Various UN teams found evidence of
indigenous production of Al Hussein warheads and fuse components in this building. In
addition, UN teams found three heavily damaged missile-carrying racks and destroyed
pieces of missile turning and handling equipment.
Building 111 was also part of Project 144/2. It was where the Iraqis formed and welded
from stainless steel sheets the cylinder sections used in Al Hussein propellant tanks.
Fourteen damaged or destroyed cylinder sections, two destroyed forming machines and
three destroyed welding machines were observed.
Building 112 was also part of Project 144/2. It was the storage building for propellant
tank cylinder sections. Although the building was almost completely destroyed, 15 intact
cylinder sections could be seen under the rubble. Several heavily damaged or destroyed
cylinder sections were also scattered about the building.
Building 113 was also part of Project 144/2. This building was used for missile
disassembly and reassembly. One intact propellant tank and several destroyed tanks were
observed.

[raaft]

السلام عليكم
صاروخ العابد الذي تم اطلاقه كان لتجربة المرحلة الاولى فقط
وهو يتكون من 3 مراحل حيث كانت المرحلة الثانية والثالثة عبارة عن وزن فقط
والمرحلة الاولى هي عبارة عن 5 صواريخ الحسين موضوعة بشكل دائري وبعد صعود الصاروخ الى 10 كم حدث كسر في السلة الرابطة بين المرحلة الاولى والثانية مماادى الى سقوط الصاروخ وكان المفروض ان يصل الى ارتفاع 12كم ثم يتم فصل المرحلة الاولى والثانية ومع هذا فقد اعتبرت التجربة ناجحة
واستمر العمل على استمرار التجارب الا غزو الكويت اوقف المشروع
رافت