Industrial offsets to reconstruct the Military and economy

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hayder
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Industrial offsets to reconstruct the Military and economy

مشاركة بواسطة hayder » الأحد يناير 16, 2011 5:33 am

This article discusses the current problems that the Iraqi military is facing with reconstituting its conventional military forces.

The Iraqi military was destroyed and dissolved in 2003. Subsequently it has been reconstituted as a mainly Counter-Insurgency light infantry force using mostly second hand "hand me down" equipment from the US and its allies as well a small quantity of salvaged equipment from the Pre-2003 armed forces. Most of the pre-2003 equipment was not actually destroyed during the war, but was ransacked and vandalised in the aftermath by both Iraqi civilians as well as US soldiers, and much of it was subsequently sold to scrap metal vendors.

During the post 2003 period, the US did not wish to rearm the reconstituted Iraqi military with modern conventional arms, instead directing it to fulfill the counter-insurgency role in liaison with the US forces in Iraq. The US military took care of all the "conventional" aspects of the military like artillery, armour, helicopters and of course attack aircraft / air defence.

Now with the coming drawdown in US forces in Iraq, we seem to be in a limbo. The Ministry of defence budget is hobbled by an excessively large payroll component that consumes most of the $11Bn it has. Leaving the Ministry with just $400M in available funds for all capital purchases. This lack of funds has retarded all efforts at purchasing the conventional components that the Iraqi military desperately needs including:
-Fighter aircraft
-Attack Aircraft
-Light Armed Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft
-Air defence radar and control network (including AEW)
-Heavy Artillery
-Main Battle Tanks
-Anti Tank Guided Weapons
-Logistics vehicles and facilities
etc...

How can Iraq expect to arm and equip its military with such limitations in a short period of time? Increasing the budget is a no-go area since it would interfere with the much more voter sensitive issue of spending on the reconstruction effort of the country when public services in Iraq are still dire and unemployment high.

Moreover Iraq has already wasted many years in negotiations, for example, with the US for the purchase of F16 aircraft, only to allow a combination of US unwillingness to export, with Iraqi budget difficulties to cut the "requests" from 36 to 24 to 18 down to the current 6 aircraft! Not to mention that the US has offered a downgraded F16 "IQ" to Iraq which has had most of the sensitive equipment stripped out (including the all important AIM-120C AMRAAM), making the plane a featherweight in an area where by 2020 Iraq would be surrounded by nations flying a mix of F35s (Israel and Turkey), Silent Eagles (Saudi Arabia), as well as unknown 4.5 generation or 5th Generation types by other gulf states. Compared to that the proposed supply of AIM-7 Sparrow missiles (of 30 years vintage, now withdrawn from use already in the US and being phased out by Iraq's neighbours) would be "insufficient" to say the least.

Now the above issue of the US releasing technology is one point. But of course, there's an even larger issue at play. Iraq's ability to pay. The US has not offered any offset agreements to Iraq for its weapons purchases so far, and there doesn't seem to be any similar offers coming from Europeans who are suffering from their own economic woes at this moment.

So what other option does Iraq have?

China.

The Chinese are aiming to expand their arms supplies around the world and have progressed by leaps and bounds in matching the technologies of the "west" over the past few years. The recent flight of the J20 stealth fighter prototype being the eye catching tip of a larger trend in Chinese progress and developments. In addition to such bleeding edge technologies, the Chinese do not neglect the "bread and butter" components of air arms, providing low-cost and simple platforms like the JF17 that can be tailored to customer requirements with weapons and avionics fit on a need basis as well as the latest J10B which is a good match for F16B52-B60 types.

However that doesn't touch on the main advantages offered by China. Co-production and industrial offsets. Iraq is in desperate need to rebuild the nation, and can hardly afford the costly programs to rebuild the military. China can offer Iraq an avenue to rebuild the country as well as the military in close collaboration, and funded by the Chinese state. But at the same time, Iraq should never be totally reliant on China.

Example

As a hypothetical example. Iraq would want a mix of Chinese and a "western" type of aircraft.

The force completion to be around 2020-2025 period.

The structure can be as follows:
-JF17Chinese - 3 squadrons (54 aircraft) - equipped with chinese radar/SD10A missiles
-JF17western - 3 squadrons (54 aircraft) - equipped with VIXEN-1000 radar/METEOR missiles
-J10B - 2 squadrons (36 aircraft) - as the two seat multi-role attack aircraft (longer range/twin seater/heavier payload than JF17).
-F16IQ - 2 squadrons (36 aircraft) - the "western backup" to stop chinese blackmailing.
-J20 - 1 squadron (18 aircraft) Around 2020-2025 as the stealthy element to match neighbours 5th Generation type, and to "convince" the US to allow Iraq to buy F35s perhaps?

The cost to acquire the Chinese aircraft we can offset from the industrial/infrastructural developments that the country needs. For Example, if the cost of the aircraft over the next 10 years is $10Bn, Iraq can request that the aircraft are not only assembled/produced in Iraq but that China make a $10Bn investment in building housing / metro / power stations / ports / railways in Iraq that would no longer be funded from Iraq's "civilian" budgets, and paid back to china on an "ongoing" business basis (e.g. the fares on a metro journey over 25 year period).

This also means that the military's existing budget can be used to buy alternative equipment from countries that don't offer the same "offsets" as China, and thus also ensuring Iraq's long term independence from one supplier (this in addition to using avionics/weapons from multiple sources, as well as having overhaul facilities for the engines/airframes as part of the contract).

Such a method is, practically speaking, the only way Iraq can hope to fund a military modernisation program, with the added bonus of having a large offset that can deliver real services to the population in a much more efficient way than the existing ministries can deliver.

author
Hayder from Iraqimilitary.org

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mosab
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Re: Industrial offsets to reconstruct the Military and econo

مشاركة بواسطة mosab » الأحد يناير 16, 2011 1:39 pm

Thanks Hayder for this excellent analysis, another point of view by DJ Elliot
http://home.comcast.net/~djyae/site/?/blog/category/27/

Thoughts on ISF Development and Iraq’s Ability to Defend Itself
01/16/2011

ISF Brigade OOB as of 31 December 2010. At this point, most are just speed bumps to a conventional invasion.

This is a pure opinion piece – a rant. Most of the times I write about what I think the Iraqi Security Forces are doing or report on what they are actually doing. Some readers think that I agree with what is being done to develop those forces. Not true. I think that they are making some very dangerous errors.

Politics – the Ruling Politicians are in Fantasyland

When I outlined my top 5 procurement priorities if I were the Iraqi Minister of Defense in an e-mail, one of my regulars replied: “Actually DJ your top priority should be the agreement to keep US forces in Iraq after 2011. All the items below are secondary.” He was quite correct.

However, both the current US and Iraqi administrations apparently do not want to listen to realistic appraisals of the ability of the ISF to defend Iraq in 2012. The ISF is a good counter-insurgency force but, it is incapable of defending Iraq against a conventional invasion. The ISF was never planned to be ready for external defense in 2012 – that capability was planned for 2020. Both US and Iraqi politicians chose the 2012 withdraw date without regard to military advice.

The ISF in 2012 will be capable as a counter-insurgency force in 2012 but, would be a speed-bump to any conventional invasion by any of its neighbors. I could see a late 2012 Iranian invasion as things stand. Without the US air defense and armor presence, the IA is dead in less than 2 weeks against Iran. And the US cannot react fast enough to prevent the fall of Iraq if we are not already there – especially given the political delays. Iraq needs the US air cover and tripwire forces guaranteeing Iraq for another decade.

Even with every weapon reported on order - delivered tomorrow instead of over the next 4 years - the IA fighting on its own would lose any fight it got into. Against an Iranian conventional invasion, the ISF would be driven back to the Shatt-al-Arab/Tigris/Diyala river line in the first 48 hours. The fall of Basrah and Baghdad would occur 5-7 days after the start of the invasion. Iranian forces would the Euphrates river line south of Baghdad at 1 week with most of the ISF destroyed.

Also, I could see the Turks being given the green-light to occupy the Kurdish region by the Iranians - "To protect the Turkic minority". While Syria gets Anbar. There would be a COIN fight for the invaders after that but; insurgents have historically only won when the enemy loses its will or if they have a conventional Army to assist them...

These are optimistic estimates - it would probably be faster. The ISF is like the South Korean Forces in June 1950: Without the necissary weapons to be more than a speed bump. Without the terrain and geographic advantages that Korea had – there will be no Pusan Perimeter.

My priorities for rearming Iraq are not all inclusive – they are just the top 5 weaknesses. Iraq will still need 10 years to effectively field them. Maybe longer if the budget isn’t there. The following priorities are not their only needs – just the 5 most urgent. [Note: I would not cancel the existing orders/options – this is just what the follow on focus should be IMO.]

Priority 1 – Real Air Defense

It does not matter how bad the enemy's Air Force is if you have nothing to counter it. Iraq has no air defense and will not start to field an effective air defense prior to 2018-2020. That is not just my opinion – it is the stated plan. In 2012, Iraq will not have a single operational fighter squadron. Fighters are expensive and the training pipeline for effective combat pilots is 2-3 years after receipt of aircraft to train on. At least 100 operational fighters are needed with 200 total fighters being optimal given the potential threats. Iraq also needs a squadron of airborne radar aircraft to provide low-altitude and gap-filler coverage. These aircraft do not need to be top of the line – they just need to be better than the most likely threats – Iran/Syria.

Iraq is currently negotiating for 18 used French Mirage 2000s and 6 US F16 plus is reported to be considering 24 Chinese J17s. The Mirages and F16s are a start but, the J17 suffers from the same problem all Russian/Chinese aircraft have. Russian engines only last half as long as western jet engines and Chinese engines are either Russian or based on Russian. Put that together with the engine overhaul facilities being in Russia or China, with the exorbitant prices and delays in spares/overhauls, means half would be grounded at any given time. Spares and engine overhauls are where the Russians and Chinese make their profit.

Currently the US provides Iraq’s air defense and there has been no reported agreement to keep that air cover beyond 2011. If I were the Iraqi Government, I would have already commenced negotiations for 8-10 USAF or NATO Fighter Squadrons [with AWACS support] to remain until the Iraqi Air Force can replace them with OPERATIONAL squadrons. I would put 50 percent of the equipment procurement budget towards this problem until they have 200 fighters with sufficient spares and munitions to be operational.

Priority 2 – Field Artillery: and I am not talking mortars.

At this point the Iraqi Army could be destroyed by stand-off howitzers since they have nothing to counter-battery enemy howitzers. Considering that their most likely enemy is an infantry heavy force - they need this firepower to offset the greater Iranian troop numbers as well. This means they need more howitzers than Iran has.

Each division needs a minimum of 72 howitzers, preferably 155mm. Not just the IA requires these. All division planned to be used in frontal roles in a total mobilization require these. That means that the IA will need to stand up separate Field Artillery Regiments to augment the Federal Police, Border Enforcement, and Kurdish Divisions in wartime or that the Ministry of Interior/KRG will need to buy their own modern artillery. About 3,000 howitzers and/or long-range [accurate] multiple rocket launchers are needed.

The only howitzers in the current Iraqi inventory are salvaged pre-war and are of questionable functionality. They have not been reported firing since they started showing up 2 years ago. They are probably worn-out training dummies. The US is providing 120 towed and 24 self-propelled 155mm howitzers in 2011 – enough for 2 divisions.

NATO standard 155mm howitzers are common and Iraq needs 3,000 of them and their ammo. About 20 percent of them should be self-propelled. I would put 20 percent of the equipment procurement budget towards this problem until they have 2,000 howitzers with sufficient spares and munitions to be operational. After that I would reduce to 10 percent until the remaining 1,000 howitzers and/or Multiple Rocket Launchers are bought and use the remaining 10 percent for other needs. The US does not have to be the only source, some of the best are made in South Africa.

Priority 3 – Anti-Tank Guided Weapons

At this point the only element of the ISF capable of defeating enemy tanks is 9th Division and that limited amount of armor cannot be everywhere at once. Company-sized armor spearheads could punch thru the IA Infantry Brigades as the IA is currently armed. The only capability Iraqi infantry have to deal with enemy armor is short-ranged RPGs. The only ATGWs currently on order are the Barrier ATGWs for the 350 combat versions of the BTR4 on order and they only carry 2-4 missiles each. Why the Iraqis have not ordered larger orders of the relatively cheap ATGWs for their infantry heavy force is baffling.

Providing 100-200 ATGWs of TOW II level or better per infantry Battalion would force Iran to concentrate its armor into Brigade or larger sized formations to break-thru. This is 350,000-500,000 missiles including MoI Battalions with secondary external security roles.

This reduces the number of potential axis’s of attack. Only 7 of the 48 Iranian Divisions are heavy. Combined with the need to concentrate at least 2 heavy Divisions opposite any IA heavy Division, the missiles in the infantry forces would reduce the number of potential armor attack points by an order of magnitude. By mounting them on vehicles – even pickups, they could be shifted within the Division to concentrate fire as needed.

I would put 10 percent of the equipment procurement budget towards this problem until filled. I would provide each non-tank equipped battalion with 25 launchers and 100-200 missiles. Using existing vehicles – even pickups – they would provide each of the battalion’s heavy weapons companies with the ability to stop armored Battalions and even possibly Brigades from breaking through and seriously complicate enemy planning. At this time only the tank and BTR4 equipped(ing) Battalions have any realistic anti-tank capability – the rest are just grease for tank treads.

Priority 4 – TANKS

The only place that the IA has a concentrated armor capability is Baghdad. And that is a slowly converting Armor Division. With the exception of terrain limitations, the rest of Iraq is wide open to armor attack. Iraq needs a mobile counter-attack force to make the opposition have to further concentrate their armor.

Once the 9th Division is up to full strength, a 3-heavy Iranian Division force would be needed to strike at Baghdad. But south of Baghdad there is nothing but terrain to slow the Iranian armor down. If 7th Division does fully mechanize and deploys to Basrah then the Iranians would need 2-heavy Divisions to strike for Basrah. Those 2 IA Divisions are the only heavy forces potentially available to Iraq and Iran has 7 heavy Divisions. This does not include potential Syrian participation – with the Israeli front pining most Syrian forces – Syria could invade Iraq as an Iranian ally with a maximum of 4 heavy Divisions.

Once the IA has 5 heavy Divisions or more [1,000 tanks], the Iranian armor options start to shrink rapidly. But that will not be anytime soon. I would put 10 percent of the equipment procurement budget towards these Tanks until 4 Armored Divisions are upgraded and use existing/delivering Armored Personnel Carriers for the infantry component. Then I would shift the funds to mixed Tanks/APCs and convert the 6 Mechanized Divisions. About 2,400 Tanks for the 10 heavy Divisions are needed.

I would not buy all M1A1 tanks as the IA is doing now. I would buy large numbers of cheaper used operational T72s as-is or M60s up-gunned to 120mm NATO smoothbore guns. After getting the numbers, I would then modernize the older tanks. [“Perfection is the enemy of good enough.”]

Priority 5 - Attack Helicopters

Existing orders/options for 50 SA342s, 50 EC635s, and 50 Bell 407s provide adequate Scout/Utility helicopter forces. Iraq needs to follow this up with a buy of 4 squadrons of real dedicated Attack Helicopters [100] to provide the anti-tank/anti-infantry mobile quick reaction force for any enemy break-thru.

I would put 10 percent of the equipment procurement budget towards these. As expensive as these are - they will not have enough to deal with more than 1 major break-thru at a time. Aircraft are grounded by weather that does not significantly affect ground forces which is a potential limit on their usefulness. This is why they are 5th in priority and the infantry's ATGWs are 3rd. If there are limited funds, the ATGWs come first. Once these are bought, then I would shift to expand the transport helicopter force to expand the number of infantry air-assault forces.

Conclusion

Without the weapons and training on using those weapons, it does not matter how good your troops are. It is like using lance armed horse cavalry against panzers in early World War II – an ineffective waste of good troops. Iraqi Forces are missing or grossly under-equipped in several key areas. Even Kuwait - the smallest country bordering Iraq - will outgun the ISF in all five of these key capabilities in 2012. Iraq will not be able to effectively defend itself until 2020 against its most likely enemies – that was always the plan.
Per Ardua, Ad Astra.

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